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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The reemergence of a professional field of international criminal law at the 
end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century—including 
prominent institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)—has reshaped how atrocities 
are handled at the international level. For the first time since International 
Military Tribunals (IMTs) at Nuremberg and in the Far East, a legal and 
normative logic of individual criminal accountability reemerged to respond to 
massive human rights violations.1 This framework revived the legacy of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, which established modern legal claims of international 
judicial and court authority. With legal authority delegated to ad hoc 
international tribunals by the UN Security Council, and with the ICC acquiring 
legal or de jure authority through treaty obligations or through the UN Security 
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 1.  See generally JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE 
HAGUE TRIBUNAL (2003); KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011); Ron Levi & John Hagan, Penser les 
«crimes de guerre», 173 ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 6–27 (2008).  
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Council, over the past three decades we have witnessed the expansion of an 
institutional and professional field of “normative legalism” that, outside of the 
European Court of Human Rights, enjoyed no authority—legal or otherwise—
during the Cold War.2 
Given the coercive nature of international criminal courts, and the 
challenges they present to state sovereignty and sovereign immunity, we 
identify the geopolitical context as crucial to delineating the scope of authority 
that these courts enjoy.3 Indeed, the importance of geopolitical context is 
evident in the very lead-up to the creation of this field of international criminal 
law, because even achieving de jure authority has been contentious.4 And even 
such courts’ de facto authority that resulted in sovereign legal accountability for 
such crimes was developed in national settings for many years during the Cold 
War before gaining significant political support on the international stage.5 
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, along with other specialized ad hoc courts and tribunals 
from the 1990s forward, built on these approaches to emphasize human rights 
enforcement through personal responsibility and punishment.6 By the time the 
Rome Statute, which created the ICC, was adopted in 1998, the authority of 
international criminal law had expanded and deepened through the landmark 
practices of these earlier ad hoc tribunals and the political momentum that 
supported their work. When one examines the narrow legal authority of these 
post–World War II and post–Cold War Tribunals—the growth in their legal 
mandate, the number of courts, the doctrinal expansion of the approach to 
prosecuting war crimes from the 1990s forward, and the creation of a 
permanent ICC in their wake—it is tempting to develop a teleological account 
of the expansion in de jure (and de facto) authority in the field of international 
criminal law.7 Yet a teleological account tends to downplay both fine-grained 
questions that an analysis of de facto authority requires, and also the capacity to 
gauge the authority of specific courts rather than of the wider field. This article 
instead analyzes two broad elements: First, the contextual factors that shape the 
authority of international courts, in particular the constituencies they can 
 
 2.  See generally GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000). 
 3.  See Mikael Rask Madsen, Explaining the Power of International Courts in Their Contexts: 
From Legitimacy to Legitimization, in COURTS, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 23, 
23–24 (Adriana Silvia Dreyzin de Klor et al. eds., 2012). 
 4.  See SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 5. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  See generally John Hagan & Ron Levi, International Police, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: 
THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 207 (Markus D. Dubber & 
Mariana Valverde eds., 2006); Jane Jenson & Ron Levi, Narratives and Regimes of Social and Human 
Rights: The Jack Pines of the Neoliberal Era, in SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA 69 
(Peter A. Hall & Michèle Lamont eds., 2013); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, From the Cold War to 
Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
231 (2006). 
 7.  See SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 14–18; Levi & Hagan, supra note 1, at 6–10.  
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mobilize, the geopolitical context in which they operate, and their relations with 
national fields of power; and second, connected to these, the international legal 
practices that these courts and their actors develop.8 It is this dual approach to 
understanding authority—the articulation between practices and contextual 
factors, with court practices continuously adapting to external contexts—that 
we operationalize through the study of international criminal courts.9 
International criminal courts uniquely draw together these two indicators of 
authority, with external contextual factors deeply connected to the internal 
legal practices that these courts go on to develop. This is because international 
criminal courts operate in what criminal justice scholars identify as “atypical 
political environments,” or highly contentious environments in which 
surrounding political conditions lead to a departure from routinized criminal 
justice, so that courts must develop organizational models to cope with, 
mobilize, and at times deflect, the political landscape in which they operate.10 
In international criminal courts, such atypical political environments are the 
norm rather than the exception. For instance, during ongoing conflicts or when 
dealing with uncooperative states, international criminal courts face unique 
constraints on their authority—including both the absence of police or arrest 
authority and limitations on searches and seizure opportunities—requiring 
prosecutors to develop new evidentiary approaches.11 Similarly, national 
governments, their leaders, and their allies often contest the very idea of 
international criminal prosecutions, so that with every move to build authority 
these courts can find themselves losing, rather than gaining, adherents and 
potential legal cases.12 So, in atypical environments, some of the usual strategies 
courts could develop to gain wider authority are often unavailable. 
Precisely because of these contextual features, we turn to prosecutorial 
strategies as a salient practice for assessing the authority of international 
criminal courts. Prosecutorial practices are not the only factor relevant to an 
international criminal court’s authority; but, in these environments, it is the 
decision to investigate, to prosecute, and to adduce evidence that is the most 
noticed and dramatic feature of their work, and that is central to their capacity 
to garner, retain, and expand its audiences and support. This article thus focuses 
on prosecutorial practices rather than the increases in case volume or the 
changes in enforcement mechanisms that other international courts use to build 
 
 8.  See generally Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes 
the Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 17, 32; Jens 
Meierhenrich, The Practice Of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., nos. 3 & 4, 2014, at 1. 
 9.  See, e.g., DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A 
WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 57 (2014); Heather Schoenfeld, Ron Levi & John Hagan, Crises extrêmes 
et institutionnalisation du droit pénal international, 36 CRITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 37 (2007). 
 10.  See generally John Hagan, Why Is There So Little Criminal Justice Theory? Neglected Macro- 
and Micro-Level Links Between Organization and Power, 26 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 117 (1989).  
 11.  See Ron Levi & Heather Schoenfeld, Médiation et droit pénal international, 174 ACTES DE LA 
RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 4, 6–9 (2008). 
 12.  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). 
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constituencies. These strategies work to enhance the authority of international 
criminal courts in the face of built-in challenges by aligning or deflecting 
geopolitical factors and constituencies. In other words, prosecutorial practices 
link the internal bureaucratic organization of these courts to their geopolitical 
contexts, and the authority of international criminal justice is augmented or 
constrained through choices that prosecutors develop and through the 
constituencies to which the prosecutors are oriented in employing these 
practices.13 
II 
INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY IN ATYPICAL POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTS: PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY AND EVIDENCE 
This article thus emphasizes links between prosecutorial strategy, legal 
evidence, and methods of case development that are crucial for constructing the 
authority of international criminal courts. Indeed, once one looks beyond the 
“high politics”14 question of jurisdiction—which, in the case of these courts, is 
what implicates their capacity to operate and gain custody over situations and 
individuals—one quickly recognizes that the question of evidence, its 
production, and its use in court represent the sort of practices that Alter, Helfer, 
and Madsen identify as international “legal practices” through which officials 
build authority.15 
Whereas in many courts international legal practices are linked to how 
international judges build authority, in the case of international criminal courts 
the key location for these practices lies upstream in the process, in the office of 
the prosecutor. Economic and human rights courts are often dependent on the 
facts and arguments adduced by external litigants; however, in international 
criminal prosecutions, the in-house indictment and the presentation of evidence 
produce alliances with external constituencies, and the authority that 
international criminal justice garners is augmented or constrained by the scope 
of the network these courts can build. Similarly, indictments and the 
presentation of evidence are central for building court authority rather than 
pursuing other international alternatives. Indeed, gaining any toehold is a 
challenge because salient actors are more likely to snub the prosecutor’s 
indictment or to comply with evidentiary demands than to rebuff a final 
judgment (prominently seen in the snubbing of the ICC by Sudanese President 
Al-Bashir).16 Finally, given that international criminal prosecutions are time-
and-space bound, these environments might risk producing, at least 
 
 13.  Due to space constraints, this article does not systematically address the constituencies to 
which international prosecutors speak beyond that which is drawn out through an analysis of 
prosecutorial practices themselves.  
      14.  NIILO KAUPPI, DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL RESOURCES AND POLITICAL POWER IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (2005). 
 15.  See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 5. 
 16.  See ADAM BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS: WAR AND INTERVENTION IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA 179 (2011). 
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domestically, one-shotters rather than repeat players.17 It is thus a challenge to 
build relationships of trust with civil society organizations, lawyers, diplomats, 
or other constituencies that would normally allow for growth in narrow and 
intermediate authority over time.18 
In other words, in these atypical political environments, court authority 
turns on the capacity of prosecutors, rather than judges, to collect and garner 
evidence of atrocities to be translated into the criminal process. They must 
organize their evidence and strategy in “loosely coupled” or “tightly coupled” 
ways with external actors, such as victims or experts.19 In contrast to economic 
cases, establishing this evidence is the concern of institutional insiders—
prosecutors—and thus these operational “low politics” of evidence collection 
and presentation are a salient policy concern. For example, a recent article in 
The New York Times focused on the challenges faced by “an extraordinary 
witness” of the ICTY.20 Reflecting on her case, an ICTY staff member noted: 
“Without witnesses, without key insiders, there are basically no trials.”21 And 
just a few months earlier, a piece in The Guardian, noted the challenges of 
working with witnesses for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder, including “huge amounts of 
testimony and paperwork [that] were generated,” and a prosecutor’s comment 
that “[l]ots of money got spent feeling our way forward. It costs a lot to fly in 
witnesses from around the world.”22 
This article thus links these organizational practices of evidence collection 
with the geopolitical context in which these courts operate.23 At Nuremberg, a 
political decision was reached to focus the prosecution on a small number of 
Nazi figures, with particular attention paid to the documenting of atrocities by 
the prosecution rather than on developing a doctrinal base of judicial decisions. 
This aligned the prosecution with a U.S.-based legal constituency and helped 
deflect the critique of a Tribunal merely furthering victor’s justice—a claim that 
bedeviled the “united nations” leading the prosecution at Nuremberg.24 The 
ICTY emerged in a context of political and professional alignments, particularly 
with the growth of the human rights community, to expand a framework for 
legal accountability in times of conflict.25 This contributed to the opportunity to 
 
 17.  See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–114 (1974). 
 18.  See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 4. 
 19.  See Hagan, supra note 10, at 117–20. 
 20.  Marlise Simons, Witness in War Crimes Court Tallies Cost of a Decade in Hiding: Testifying 
Against Slobodan Milosevic at Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2014, at A5. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Owen Bowcott, Rwanda Genocide: The Fight to Bring the Perpetrators to Justice, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/rwanda-genocide-fight-
justice. 
 23.  See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 26–27; Hagan, supra note 10, at 130. 
 24.  See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 27 (1998). 
 25.  See generally HAGAN, supra note 1. 
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produce significant jurisprudence, based largely on the prosecutorial framing of 
these crimes rather than the reasoning of the final judgments.26 Despite the 
financial, moral, and political support of Western governments, civil society 
organizations, domestic political constituencies seeking economic benefits for 
reconstruction, and the international human rights community rallying behind 
the extension of human rights into the complexities of war and conflict, ICTY 
prosecutors still needed to gain narrow and intermediate authority by enrolling 
compliance partners with which to do their work.27 They thus responded to this 
authority deficit in strategic fashion over time by leveraging the extensive 
authority they enjoyed to secure defendants and evidence that would expand 
the Tribunal’s caseload, to ascertain the collaboration of media partners to 
build constituencies, and to later develop a strategy to coordinate with national 
court prosecutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Compare the ICTY to the treaty-based ICC, which was negotiated during 
the momentum that grew around the ICTY and the project of international 
legalism. But despite this momentum, the ICC became operational in the post-
9/11 climate, a disjuncture that affected its capacity to deliver on original 
hopes.28 Attempts to grow its caseload volume generated resistance to its 
jurisdiction and the withdrawal of voluntary state parties. Indeed, the authority 
of the ICC is at stake in the potential withdrawal of African Union states from 
the ICC, with the African Union expressing concern over the “politicization 
and the misuse of indictments against African leaders by the ICC,”29 and a 
continued call to “speak with one voice” regarding these prosecutions.30 It is 
perhaps not surprising that its first prosecutor has insisted that the measure of 
the Court’s success should not be its judgments, but a combination of 
deterrence and local legal accountability that could drive the Court’s caseload 
to zero. The ICC’s early prosecutions to date have thus targeted a small number 
of high profile cases. 
In these three courts, once one looks beyond the “high politics”31 of the 
field’s relationship to peacemaking and diplomacy, court authority relies to a 
significant degree on, and is reflected in, prosecutors’ practices. Prosecutors 
choose their evidentiary strategies based on the geopolitical context at hand and 
work to enhance court authority by identifying evidentiary strategies that align 
 
 26.  See Kelly Askin, Analysis: Foca’s Monumental Jurisprudence, Tribunal Update 226 (June 18–
23, 2001), https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;c4188521.0106. 
 27.  See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
(1996). 
 28.  BOSCO, supra note 9, at 72–76. 
 29.  Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, AFRICAN 
UNION 1 (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Ext_Assembly_AU_Dec_Decl_ 12Oct2013 
.pdf. 
 30.  Press Release, African Union Assembly, 22nd Ordinary Session of the African Union 
Assembly Concludes: A Summary of Key Decisions (Jan. 31, 2014), http://summits.au.int/en/ 
22ndsummit/events/22nd-ordinary-session-african-union-assembly-concludes-summary-key-decisions-0. 
 31.  KAUPPI, supra note 14, at passim. 
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the prosecutors with important external constituencies. By analogizing to 
atypical domestic trials, we identify that the success or failure to build 
international legal authority in these settings is conditioned by the different 
political, legal, and organizational arrangements in which international courts 
operate.32 Turning to three main cases—Nuremberg, the ICTY, and the ICC—
this article examines how these prosecutors build authority differently across 
geopolitical contexts. 
III 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG 
In his opening statement to the Nuremberg trials in 1945, the Chief 
Prosecutor for the United States, Justice Robert Jackson, stressed the 
importance of documentary proof in the prosecution.33 “We will give you 
undeniable proofs of incredible events,” he said, referring among other items to 
“hundreds of tons of official German documents,” the “captured orders and 
captured reports” that provide evidence of atrocities, and the violence and 
criminal enterprise that “we will prove from their own documents.”34 This 
attention to documents became the leitmotif of the prosecution, and with it a 
reflection on the machinery of Nazi Germany itself: “There is no count in the 
Indictment that cannot be proved by books and records,” Jackson indicated, 
emphasizing that “[t]he Germans were meticulous record keepers.”35 And 
indeed this was Jackson’s position for months leading up to the prosecution, in 
which he stressed the record of the IMT and its need to be perceived as 
authoritative.36  In one of his best-known statements at the International 
Conference leading to the trials, Jackson insisted, “We must establish incredible 
events by credible evidence,” stating that the trial would be “a drab case” based 
on documentary evidence of Nazi crimes, but that the documents would render 
it unchallengeable.37 
 
 
 32.  See generally Hagan, supra note 10. 
 33.  See Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal (Nov. 
21, 1945), http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-
jackson/opening-statement-before-the-international-military-tribunal/. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. This lies in contrast to the later Tokyo trial that relied substantially on affidavits from 
prisoners of war. See TIM MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 57–58 
(2001). 
 36.  See DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE FORMATION 
OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY 60–69 (2001); CHRISTIAN DELAGE, CAUGHT ON CAMERA: 
FILM IN THE COURTROOM FROM THE NUREMBERG TRIALS TO THE TRIALS OF THE KHMER ROUGE 
63–82 (2013); LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN 
THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 41–53, 114 (2001); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 43–55 (1993); Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the 
Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 4, 1559–98 (2006).    
 37.  Stephen Breyer, Crimes Against Humanity: Nuremberg 1946, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162 
(1996). 
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The document-based tone of Nuremberg permeated the courtroom. As 
observed in The New Yorker, the trials were frightfully dull—so much so that 
the lawyers and staff “want[ed] to leave Nuremberg as urgently as a dental 
patient enduring the drill wants to get up and leave the chair.”38 Similarly, 
Joseph Kessel wrote that the Nuremberg trial’s emphasis on documents did not 
allow for any “breath of life,” with the most animated discussions focusing on 
the numbering of files and exhibits.39 
Legal and historical analysts of the Nuremberg tribunal have understood the 
decision to rely on documentary evidence as driven by the sheer availability of 
documents of Nazi crimes and atrocities. Yet the extent of the Nuremberg 
Court’s authority at that time demonstrates that the documentary reliance was 
also a prosecutorial practice tied to both the geopolitical context and the 
specific support that the prosecution enjoyed with external constituencies. The 
authority the Nuremberg prosecution strove to develop thereby relied on 
preexisting U.S.-based legal practices, so as to build extensive authority among 
a U.S.-based community of lawyers, and to help overcome some of the broader 
skepticism over the trials. 
In their analysis of how international courts expand their authority over 
time, Alter, Helfer, and Madsen emphasize that recently established courts 
draw upon preexisting international legal practices from other domains, 
whereas older international courts are often forced to invent new practices in 
their area.40 This article suggests that in the case of the IMT at Nuremberg, 
building a constituency at home (and a professional constituency that would 
support the prosecution from within the Tribunal as well) was achieved by 
drawing on preexisting national legal practices from other domains—in this case 
prominent antitrust cases in the United States. At an early stage in this field’s 
development, this strategy positioned the tribunal well with respect to the 
powerful constituency of legal elites in the United States with whom it was in 
dialogue, and for many of the institutional insiders at Nuremberg represented 
the professional community to which they belonged. 
To understand the prosecutorial strategy of the IMT one must contend with 
the overwhelming early suspicion—both in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, and certainly in the former Soviet Union—surrounding the idea of 
criminal prosecution of Nazi leaders, regarded by many as risky and viewed by 
some elites and the public as an overly soft response. This was instantiated in 
the view of Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who 
derided the strategy as “kindness and Christianity”41 rather than a strategy to 
 
 38.  Rebecca West, A Reporter at Large: Extraordinary Exile, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 1946, at 
34, 35. 
 39.  JOSEPH KESSEL, JUGEMENTS DERNIERS: LES PROCES PETAIN, NUREMBERG ET EICHMAN 
(2007). 
 40.  See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 26. 
 41.  BASS, supra note 2, at 162. 
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deindustrialize Germany and to “attack[] the German mind” itself.42 The IMT’s 
comparative lack of early authority was reflected in the views of elite 
government lawyers such as Joseph O’Connell, who regarded the Tribunal as a 
fundamentally “unlegalistic approach” that applies domestic approaches “to a 
world situation which has nothing in common with it.”43 It was similarly 
reflected in the early views of President Roosevelt, who sought to emphasize 
the collective responsibility of the German people, rather than merely that of “a 
few Nazi leaders.”44 Second, among other segments there was criticism over the 
tribunal’s perceived legitimacy, with the trials often derided as “victor’s justice,” 
and the criminal counts enumerated in the Charter of the IMT characterized as 
ex post facto charges that undercut legal and political legitimacy.45 Even Judith 
Shklar, who produced the classic defense of the liberalism of Nuremberg, 
concluded that “little can be said on behalf of the legality of the Trial,”46 with 
some leading legal figures of the time expressing concern over this very point.47 
And third, the prosecution was internally embattled: each of the Allies were 
pursuing different goals, and each articulated the rationale for the prosecution 
differently depending on the degree to which they regarded themselves as 
victims of the Nazi regime.48 
A strategy of identifying a small number of Nazi leaders for prosecution at 
trial won out over competing views that emphasized summary executions of 
leaders or a broad collective punishment of Germans.49 The documentary 
approach undergirding this newly adopted strategy was based on a U.S. legal 
strategy developed for domestic purposes in the antitrust litigation of the New 
Deal. This was combined with the decision to prosecute leading Nazi figures not 
for the atrocities of the Holocaust, but for the crime of aggressive war—a crime 
which turned on a reading of international legal obligations deriving from the 
Kellogg–Briand Pact of the interwar years.50 While the prosecution would 
include war crimes and a newly created “crime against humanity,” even these 
charges were cabined—by the prosecutors and the Tribunal’s judges—to 
atrocities that could be tied to aggressive war.51 
 
 
 42.  Id. at 152. 
 43.  Id. at 179. 
 44.  Id. at 154. 
 45.  See MINOW, supra note 24, at 27; cf. Susanne Karstedt, The Nuremberg Tribunal and German 
Society: International Justice and Local Judgment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, in THE LEGACY OF 
NUREMBERG: CIVILISING INFLUENCE OR INSTITUTIONALISED VENGEANCE? 13 (David A. 
Blumenthal & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 2008) (discussing the influence of the Nuremberg Trials 
in Germany). 
 46.  JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 168 (1964). 
 47.  See, e.g., Max Radin, Justice at Nuremberg, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 369 (1946). 
 48.  See BASS, supra note 2, at 147. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBURG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945–46: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 229–30 (1997). 
 51.  See DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 48–53. 
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Jackson’s prosecutorial strategy was deeply rooted and mirrored in the 
experience of his leadership team. This, in turn, was mirrored in the personnel 
who were drawn to the Court. Most of the prosecutorial team had no 
international legal capital, and its members were often young and 
comparatively inexperienced. Indeed, the jurisconsultes of the UN War Crimes 
Commission, who might have brought international expertise to the case, were 
reluctant to join the Nuremberg prosecution.52 Yet if junior staff filled the 
prosecutorial ranks, the most senior of the U.S. lawyers at Nuremberg were 
those who had been instrumental in U.S. antitrust cases.  Robert Jackson played 
a leading role in such cases throughout the 1930s,53 and he was joined at 
Nuremberg by other prominent New Deal veterans of antitrust litigation: 
William Donovan of the OSS; John Amen of the U.S. Attorney General’s 
Office, who was New York’s “leading ‘crime buster’” and son-in-law of 
President Cleveland;54 and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War and the leading 
proponent in the Roosevelt Administration for holding war crimes trials. These 
lawyers had all invested in antitrust litigation strategies for criminal 
prosecutions domestically, whether dealing with corporations such as the Sugar 
Trust or with gangsters in New York.55 The Sugar Trust prosecution notably 
built a “joint criminal enterprise” approach that was the foundation for the 
Nuremberg trials.56  The strategy displayed positions in the Nazi leadership 
regime and an analysis of the Nazi organizational structure—with documentary 
records providing the material needed to establish the IMT’s authority over the 
case.57 
Taking this shared domestic legal experience to the international stage—and 
to a tribunal that was considered to be without precedent—was a prosecutorial 
strategy designed to resonate with the existing practices of a powerful legal 
expert constituency within the United States. Indeed, the leading U.S. 
government designer and champion of the trial-based approach at Nuremberg, 
Henry Stimson took the view that this prosecutorial practice would resolve the 
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“difficult question” of the Nuremberg trials.58 Relying on documents and 
adopting an antitrust-type format, Stimson followed a prosecution strategy “in a 
way which is at the same time consistent with our traditional judicial principles 
and also will be effective in dispensing adequate punishment and also will leave 
a permanent record in the shape of the evidence collected of the evils against 
which we have fought this war.”59 In other words, Stimson not only agreed with 
Jackson’s documentary-based prosecutorial strategy, but he identified it as a 
way to square the circle of ongoing, potential authority challenges the Tribunal 
was facing. 
Veteran New Deal lawyers were convinced that such a format would 
resonate with a community of adherents in the United States, while also 
providing an opportunity for the IMT to build an authoritative narrative about 
the war. The Assistant Secretary of War and Wall Street Lawyer John McCloy 
went so far as to enthusiastically assure Secretary of Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau that “[a]fter Justice Jackson puts the Gestapo on the stand and has 
indicted them like the American Sugar Company or whatever it was, then he 
says ‘By God, you’re guilty.’”60 This emphasis was perhaps seen otherwise by 
Sidney Kaplan, a member of the prosecutorial team at Nuremberg, who wrote 
the day before the trial began, “[T]he prosecution is utterly, completely, 
hopelessly, unprepared. Jackson will deliver a sensational opening statement—
and from that point on we’re in the soup.”61 As historian Gary Bass concludes, 
Nuremberg was mainly U.S.-created and led, with the allies following suit.62 
Procedures would reflect the work of keeping agreement across countries, such 
as the lengthy indictment that would recite details in a manner uncommon for a 
U.S. prosecution.63 Beyond the national legal constituency from which Jackson 
and many leaders on the team emerged, the IMT prosecution also sought to 
build authority for the Nuremberg trials by looking to the future and the 
anticipated legacy of the trial. Jackson sought to do so by building an external 
constituency for the Tribunal by emphasizing the historical momentum it could 
spur. In so doing, Jackson privileged documentary evidence and actively sought 
to limit testimony as much as possible.64 As he wrote to Stimson, Jackson 
perceived this evidentiary basis as “the sounder foundation for the case, 
particularly when the record is examined by the historian.”65 
For this strategy to succeed, Jackson required documentation. Europe was 
in a ravaged state, and there were an enormous number of documents to 
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locate.66 Jackson reached out to gain the cooperation of the secretive Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor organization of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and its Director General William Joseph Donovan.  
Donovan and the OSS had been keeping files on potential Nazi war criminals 
for years and had a collection of intelligence materials from OSS secret agents 
who operated within the Nazi hierarchy and resistance networks.67 The OSS had 
a long-standing presentation branch that specialized in presenting complex 
matters by bringing together charts, film, or photography.68 The OSS also had 
personnel fluent in German and with deep knowledge of German society.69 
Yet the OSS would also critique this document-based strategy. Leading 
officials in the OSS, including Donovan, maintained that Jackson should rely on 
witness testimony to draw in the mainstream media and depict atrocities.70 This 
article ventures that this difference in trial strategy was not only tactical, but 
was also about the very goals of the Tribunal itself, its capacity to attract 
adherents, and the audience to which Donovan himself was oriented. For 
Donovan, Nuremberg “was a lawsuit plus something else.”71 In contrast to 
building authority with historians or for posterity, Donovan was most sensitive 
to the short-term political impact of the trial in Germany and its opportunity to 
set a foundation for de-Nazification policies.72 Therefore, while proponents of 
documentary evidence focused on enhancing the Tribunal’s legal authority, 
Donovan was interested in the trial’s immediate political effects on post-war 
Germany. 
Jackson’s strategies for achieving authority for the Tribunal led him to reject 
most of Donovan’s suggestions regarding witness testimony. Jackson was 
reticent to include testimony from victims or from defendants: victims could be 
subject to attacks on their credibility, and defendants testifying could give the 
impression that a plea bargain had taken place.73 Witness testimony was 
regarded as an “unnecessary cumulation of evidence,” and importantly for the 
Court’s capacity to build its authority through its prosecutorial practices, 
witnesses would—in Jackson’s view—run the risk of demonstrating “a strong 
bias against the Hitler regime.”74 He even rejected the views of some on his 
team who suggested that the case gain “added authority” by having atrocities 
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presented by “a group of high churchmen” who could speak to Nazi atrocities—
in favor of a strategy that would control the evidence in a measured and 
systematic way.75 Although he relented a little with time,76 Jackson stated that 
the prosecution would “put on no witnesses we could reasonably avoid.”77 
The evidentiary approach of the IMT at Nuremberg demonstrates the close 
connection between legal practices and geopolitical context that is critical to 
international court authority. This was a highly atypical political environment: 
the Allies had occupied Germany, the Nazi regime had extensively documented 
its crimes, and the leading defendants were captured and in the dock. The 
Tribunal itself, in this environment, was perceived as exceptional and the object 
of widespread skepticism among European and American constituencies. The 
decision to rely nearly exclusively on documentary evidence, and to resist 
witness testimony—at the expense of not only media attention, but also 
immediate political outcomes in post-war Germany, the chance to build such 
media as a platform for victims of Nazi Germany to speak out, and even a 
potentially reduced emphasis on some atrocities78—can partly be explained as 
an effort to build authority for the Tribunal and the legalistic approach it 
pursued. 
Nuremburg’s prosecutorial practices shed light on an important and 
potentially generalizable lesson for the study of international court authority. 
Nuremberg was a new, time-limited court for which narrow and intermediate 
authority was not an issue, due to the occupation of Germany by the Allies and 
the availability of incriminating documents. Yet building extensive authority 
was another matter. With the United States occupying a dominant position 
among the Allies in the post-war period, the Tribunal’s prosecution sought to 
produce this extensive authority by relying on a well-known and highly 
regarded domestic legal strategy, as Stimson noted, to resolve the “difficult 
question” of the Nuremberg trials.79 Antitrust lawyers with close ties to the state 
came to dominate at the Tribunal with this move. Thus, Jackson’s documentary 
strategy appears to have bolstered the IMT’s authority within the community of 
elite U.S. lawyers whose work on antitrust cases defined their practices with a 
prosecutorial approach that built in this extensive authority and that deflected 
potential resistance from the start. 
IV 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
The Cold War soon made it politically unfeasible to develop international 
legal or political responses to war crimes, a geopolitical conjuncture that led to 
waning professional momentum for international war crimes prosecutions in 
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both Europe and the United States.80 With the end of the Cold War, however, 
two influential institutions emerged. The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was established in 1995 to investigate human rights 
abuses that occurred under the apartheid regime, and underwritten by an 
argument that overtly positioned itself in distinction to that of Nuremberg and 
of trials.81 Established in 1992 by the UN Security Council, the ICTY was the 
first international war crimes tribunal in the post–Cold War era. This turn to 
law was partly fuelled by political expediency, and as Samantha Power notes, it 
“seemed a low-cost, low-risk way for Western states to signal that despite their 
opposition to military intervention, they were not indifferent to Bosnia’s 
suffering.”82 
Basic legal authority (or jurisdiction) was explicitly delegated to the ICTY 
by Security Council Resolution. Indeed, there was significant appetite and 
support for a legal framework to respond to atrocities committed in war. This 
included political support from powerful states and in particular the Clinton 
Administration, which provided the ICTY with resources, expertise, and 
political support.83 This was further supplemented by the expansion of an 
internationalized field of human rights84 and the growing influence of human 
rights organizations that had gained in technical proficiency, professional savvy, 
and political autonomy over the 1980s. This growing influence included 
extending to the law of armed conflict—as well as the media savvy of human 
rights and feminist organizations to raise awareness of the atrocities being 
committed.85 Emerging in the early 1990s, the ICTY found itself in a context 
with a political and professional appetite for articulating the link between 
human rights and armed conflict. 
Yet even with this Security Council delegation, and buoyed by significant 
political, professional, and social movement support that translated to extensive 
authority for its work, the ICTY initially found itself in a precarious position 
respecting its intermediate authority, namely its capacity to attract compliance 
partners.86 The Court even felt constraints on its narrow authority; it had no 
indictees to prosecute or tools to do its work. The ICTY’s position as a “virtual 
tribunal” defined the strategies that its prosecutors could develop. Though 
states are formally required to cooperate with its investigations, as a practical 
matter, the access of Tribunal prosecutors to documentary evidence, their 
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ability to effect arrests, or to interview witnesses remained dependent on states’ 
willingness to extend such cooperation.87 As the First President of the ICTY 
Antonio Cassese emphasized, the Tribunal is “like an armless and legless giant 
which needs artificial limbs to act and move. These limbs are the State 
authorities . . . . If state authorities fail to carry out their responsibilities, the 
giant is paralyzed, no matter how determined its efforts.”88 
In other words, in contrast to the IMT, where prosecutors had the needed 
intermediate authority thanks to the readily available documentary evidence—
and focused on building extensive authority—the prosecutorial strategy at the 
ICTY needed to build intermediate authority among compliance partners and 
thereby collect and develop the evidence required for prosecution. The 
Tribunal was supported in doing so by the broad authority it could draw upon 
politically and professionally, and from among civil society groups. In what 
follows, this article demonstrates how the first three Chief Prosecutors of the 
ICTY were central to developing this authority by turning to political and 
military partners to obtain detainees, to increase its funding base, to develop 
new investigatory powers, and to introduce legal practices in the Balkans that 
allowed the continued development of prosecutable cases. Each Chief 
Prosecutor did so by building on his or her social and professional background 
and resources and sought to change the context in which the ICTY’s authority 
was weakest. 
The first Chief Prosecutor to enter into this operational context was Justice 
Richard Goldstone. A South African judge who had just finished as chair of the 
Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation, Goldstone came to the ICTY with a strong understanding of law 
and diplomacy, seeing his position as a “big-picture diplomatic role” rather than 
“hands-on prosecution work,”89 and endorsing a public role through interviews 
and travel designed to promote the ICTY’s image.90 This allowed him to enroll 
compliance partners by integrating prosecutorial strategy with efforts to induce 
cooperation by external constituencies. 
Aware that without indictments he risked UN budget cuts, and conscious of 
judicial frustration with the Tribunal’s empty prison, Goldstone 
opportunistically relied on the national German police arrest of Duško Tadić to 
deliver the Court’s first, if relatively low-level, detainee. Despite uncertainty as 
to whether Tadić had been in a leadership position in planning crimes, 
Goldstone took the position that building compliance was most important.91 
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Indeed, when faced the next year with a continued lack of compliance from the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO in arresting indictees, 
Goldstone proceeded—despite the legalistic reservations of prosecutorial 
staff—with in abstentia hearings to pressure international authorities to 
apprehend two high-profile indictees, a process that drove Radovan Karadzic 
out of elected office.92 
Similarly, when Dražen Erdemović was taken into custody in Belgrade, 
Goldstone made a public demand that he appear before the Tribunal. This 
demand combined with American political pressure, leading to Erdemović’s 
transfer to the ICTY within several weeks. Goldstone also drew on diplomatic 
networks to expand the Tribunal’s authority to collect evidence of atrocities, 
obtaining Central Intelligence Agency aerial imagery to identify mass graves 
sites, and negotiating with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke for 
Slobodan Milošević to allow State Department visits to the area around 
Srebrenica. These compliance gains opened the door for the Tribunal’s 
exhumation work. Indeed, once some victims’ bodies were exhumed, the 
Tribunal further claimed search and seizure powers under the Dayton Accords 
to collect evidence about the massacre from Bosnian Serb military 
headquarters.93 
Yet without individuals in custody, it was difficult for the ICTY to enjoy the 
narrow authority it needed for prosecutions. Goldstone was astute at 
reconciling this by building the ICTY’s intermediate authority through political 
networks that drew on the Tribunal’s existing well of extensive authority. With 
a limited set of legal tools at his disposal—and despite legal reservations over 
the legitimacy of some tactics—Goldstone expanded the Tribunal’s authority by 
opportunistically enrolling networks of national and international authorities, 
with the ICTY gaining influence over politics and diplomacy.94 In the process, 
Goldstone obtained a sustained annual budget along with compliance partners 
outside of the Tribunal. He indicated that “I think I spent more of my time on 
diplomacy and pushing and talking and screaming and shouting for the Tribunal 
than on the simply prosecutorial work.”95 
The second Chief Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, pursued a similar path in 
building the Tribunal’s intermediate authority through compliance partners—
focusing more on the ICTY’s coercive criminal law mandate to increase the 
ICTY’s caseload of indictees by working with external enforcement agencies, 
gaining state cooperation with the Tribunal, and garnering media interest in the 
Tribunal’s work. Arbour brought training in criminal law that opened avenues 
for drawing in new compliance partners; perhaps presaging this approach, she 
began her tenure by distancing the Tribunal from the human rights 
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organizations that had mobilized to create the Tribunal, to instead building a 
constituency of criminal lawyers and investigators.96 If the Tribunal already 
enjoyed the sort of extensive authority that civil society would offer, the 
prosecution needed to instead focus on gaining custody over defendants and 
cooperation from recalcitrant states. The first President of the ICTY, Antonio 
Cassese, noted that the main problem of the Court’s authority lay in this 
practical level: indicating that this war crimes tribunal “purports to exercise 
international criminal jurisdiction,” Cassese stressed that the problem of state 
sovereignty remains “when it comes to the day-to-day operations of the 
Tribunal,” and that when states do not cooperate with the ICTY “[it] is like lava 
burning away the foundations of the institution.”97 
Given the Tribunal’s lack of police powers, Arbour’s first prosecutorial 
innovation was to open new opportunities for partnership and authority with 
militaries and intelligence agencies by pursuing “sealed” indictments to detach 
her prosecutorial strategy from political constraints and resistance of local 
authorities. This allowed high-profile arrests to be executed by U.S. and UN 
authorities, the British-led Stabilization Force, and later, arrests effected by 
Dutch, American, and French-led troops that had previously been shamed by 
their lack of compliance. In this way, the prosecutor was able to overcome the 
political stonewalling and hesitation that threatened the Tribunal’s relevance. 
Indeed, when Arbour later indicted Milošević at the end of her tenure, she 
similarly did so with the benefit of secrecy, which allowed her to work with 
intelligence agencies across five countries and outside public diplomacy, and to 
obtain the largest handover to an outside agency in the history of British 
intelligence.98 Following this innovation, Arbour’s prosecutorial team then 
defended the approach of third-party arrests by NATO and other forces, an 
approach that was later backed by the Appeals Chamber in advancing the 
obligation of third parties to conduct arrests and transfer indictees to the Hague 
and also in shielding these arrests from claims of illegality. Arbour  similarly 
took the position that despite the conventional internationalist emphasis on 
state sovereignty, some form of subpoena power must reside in the Tribunal. In 
response, precisely because it otherwise had no enforcement agents of its own, 
the Appeals Chamber fashioned a new tool of a “binding order” for the 
Tribunal.99 
Arbour’s second approach in increasing intermediate authority was to gain 
greater state cooperation from Balkan states, relying on the extensive political 
authority of the ICTY with Western nations to induce cooperation as a 
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condition of financial assistance. This compelled national leaders to hand over 
evidence and indictees to the Tribunal: Croatia thus transferred indictees in 
conjunction with its acceptance into the Council of Europe and its receipt of 
monetary aid, and Serbia later did so in transferring Milošević and Karadžić to 
The Hague following the proffer of U.S. financial incentives. 
Finally, in addition to her efforts with militaries, intelligence agencies, and 
NATO forces, Arbour’s third prosecutorial innovation was to gain some control 
over the public messaging and media image of the Court. She did so by 
cultivating partners and networks with the media to generate public support for 
the ICTY and its on-site, real-time, and highly emotive investigations. The 
extensive media coverage of prosecutor-led exhumations was crucial in 
capturing the attention of the world and the attention of UN budget officials, 
who had the capacity to increase their monetary support for the ICTY’s 
investigatory work. Indeed, as widespread media coverage of the Milošević 
indictment and a prosecutorial showdown at the Macedonian border made 
clear, media coverage of the Tribunal and its developed ability to capture the 
attention of the world became one of the key successes of the ICTY.100 
As Arbour reflected, “I think about Nuremberg every day! The images 
constantly come to mind.”101 In this, Arbour expressed her envy of the 
Nuremberg prosecutors, where the Court had its defendants in custody, along 
with every document necessary. It is precisely to fill this gap in authority that 
the first two ICTY prosecutors engaged with a wider range of compliance 
partners. This was successful: over the first five years, the ICTY benefited from 
a consistent rate of arrested individuals transferred to The Hague, a tripling of 
the annual budget, an increase in voluntary contributions from states that 
tracked the number of successful arrests, and increased morale among the 
Tribunal staff sent on missions in the field to conduct investigatory work.102 In 
some sense, as the Tribunal achieved greater intermediate authority, it came to 
enjoy greater extensive authority as well. 
The third Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, inherited an organization with 
a ninety-million-dollar budget, multiple trials underway, and a high level of staff 
morale. New state and military cooperation was prompting more arrests, and 
more indictees arrived at the Tribunal every month. The challenge for del Ponte 
was to secure convictions while also managing political pressure to end 
investigations and complete ICTY trials swiftly. 
Given this context, del Ponte’s efforts to increase the ICTY’s authority were 
no longer as focused on support by militaries and states—other than ensuring 
the transfer of Milošević to the Hague through a U.S. donor pledge—but on 
building the Tribunal’s legal authority in its prosecutions. To do so, del Ponte 
focused on the successful prosecution of complex criminal cases, building on her 
previous work in her capacity as Swiss Attorney General, during which she 
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investigated bankers, politicians, and organized crime members. She is known 
for claiming to have “never served anyone or anything but the law.”103 In the 
ICTY she thus went on to develop “monumental” cases, such as that identifying 
rape as a crime against humanity104 and the successful prosecution of genocide 
charges stemming from the Srebrenica massacre—legal successes that del Ponte 
echoed by reorganizing the Office of the Prosecutor to give lawyers greater 
control over investigations and to emphasize courtroom successes over new 
investigations or arrests.105 When Milošević was indicted for genocide, del Ponte 
drew on her experience with Swiss prosecutions of complex financial crimes and 
asserted that “instead of pulling and pushing to get detainees, our work has 
moved more fully into the courtrooms, which is where it belongs.”106 
Here, del Ponte’s prosecutorial strategy echoed the new legal and 
geopolitical context in which the Court found itself: under political pressure 
from the United States to wrap up the Tribunal’s efforts rather than issue new 
arrests that would prolong the ICTY’s prosecutions. Yet this too necessitated 
new compliance partners to build the ICTY’s authority in a changing 
geopolitical context, a shifting context that was absent for the shorter-lived 
Nuremberg trials. With powerful states fatigued over these prosecutions, and 
with concern in the United States over the potential reach of international 
criminal law, the ICTY’s “completion strategy” resonated with del Ponte’s 
decision to increase the number of trials and to decrease the number of new 
investigations. Prosecutions were thus limited to “the most senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal” and lower-level cases were transferred to “competent national 
jurisdictions.”107 
The ICTY then began the transfer of a significant number of cases to 
domestic courts. These courts became the newest compliance partners for the 
Tribunal, with transfers legally overseen by the ICTY’s Rule 11bis to refer 
indictments to another court.108 Although political constraints have made this 
less successful outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there have been beneficial 
effects for extending the ICTY’s authority through the War Crimes Section in 
the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the transfer of ICTY personnel, the 
active influence of ICTY prosecutorial know-how, capacity development, 
assistance with human rights expertise, the use in the War Crimes Section of 
 
 103.  CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH 
HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY (2009); Ed Vulliamy, Avenging 
Angel, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2001), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/04/warcrimes 
.comment. 
 104.  See Askin, supra note 26. 
 105.  Hagan, Levi & Ferrales, supra note 96, at 604. 
 106.  Marlise Simons, Court on Crimes in Former Yugoslavia Hits Its Stride, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/international/europe/15hague.html. 
 107.  S.C. Res. 1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). 
 108.  See Yuval Shany, How Can International Criminal Courts Have a Greater Impact on National 
Criminal Proceedings? Lessons from the First Two Decades of International Criminal Justice in 
Operation, 46 ISR. L. REV. 431, 438 (2013). 
LEVI_12-23 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  11:31 AM 
308 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:289 
evidence from ICTY proceedings, lessons learned from the ICTY regarding the 
need for transparency in case selection, and a reliance on ICTY jurisprudence 
and sentencing practices as persuasive authority.109 By expanding the 
community of actors drawing on ICTY precedents reinforcing the field as a 
whole, the expansion of ICTY authority has had the effect of establishing 
greater intermediate and extensive authority for the Tribunal. 
Compared to the IMT, the ICTY provides a case study of an international 
court that—though enjoying formal delegation from the UN Security Council 
and extensive authority politically—required prosecutorial strategies to build its 
narrow and intermediate authority by mobilizing external compliance partners. 
Whereas the prosecutorial team at Nuremberg had the evidence it needed, the 
first three ICTY Chief Prosecutors instead needed to build alliances across 
potential compliance partners—diplomats, police forces, and militaries—to 
secure state cooperation and to cope with a changing geopolitical context 
toward domestic courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They could do so precisely 
by leveraging the extensive authority among powerful states that the Court 
already enjoyed. The needed compliance partners reflected the political context 
in which each of the first three Chief Prosecutors found themselves, and the 
social backgrounds they could bring to the ICTY to influence the context itself. 
Thus, these prosecutors successfully solidified the ICTY’s narrow and 
intermediate authority while gaining ever greater extensive authority for the 
Tribunal and the field as a whole. 
V 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The latest chapter in international criminal justice is being written at the 
ICC, which faces a precarious political and legal position. Its creation was 
negotiated at the height of the international human rights community’s 
commitment to international prosecution, but it began its operations in a post-
9/11 environment. It is further embattled by resistance among powerful states as 
well as African Union countries threatening to withdraw from the Court as a 
backlash to its investigations against sitting heads of state. ICC prosecutors thus 
find themselves in a unique position regarding Court authority.110 Perhaps more 
so than the ICTY, the ICC enjoys extensive authority among the growing 
professional community in international criminal law. Yet because the ICC 
deals with ongoing contentious situations—involving states in which multiple 
actors are engaged with diverse political options to manage conflicts—and 
because the Prosecutor can investigate all offenses on the territory once a 
situation is opened, the Court is continually in a weak position. It enjoys less 
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narrow authority and less intermediate authority than the ICTY. In addition, 
whereas it enjoys deep extensive authority among international legal experts, 
this is uneven given the resistance to the Court by powerful states, growing 
resistance in states where the Prosecutor is likely to pursue situations, and 
vociferous academic debate over the basic goals and utility of the Court. 
In some ways, the ICC finds itself only obliquely as the inheritor of a past 
trajectory of international criminal law111 and the wider field of global justice. 
Compared to the IMT at Nuremberg, the ICC enjoys a professionalized base of 
legal scholarship and practitioners on which to draw, but it is faced with 
persistent challenges to its narrow and intermediate authority: states 
threatening withdrawal from the Court, a range of powerful states that have not 
joined the Court, and Security Council referrals that risk not succeeding in 
contentious situations. 
For most of the past decade the ICC has been known by association with its 
first Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo. Ocampo had headed 
Transparency International for Latin America, directed a law firm focusing on 
corruption, criminal law, and human rights, and prosecuted the generals in the 
post-transition Trial of the Juntas in Argentina. Like his predecessors at the 
ICTY, Ocampo stated he found the ICC challenging because as Chief 
Prosecutor he had to pursue war criminals without the benefits of police and 
arrest powers.  “I am a stateless prosecutor,” Ocampo lamented. “I have 100 
states under my jurisdiction and zero policemen.”112 Indeed, the ICC’s budget, 
though the same as that of the ICTY, is spread across investigations in different 
countries and situations rather than focused on one geographic region, partly 
because the ICC is designed to both defer to and encourage domestic 
investigations and trials.113 Yet Ocampo also faced a dilemma in his mandate. 
With the ICC limited by its statute to cases in which countries were unwilling or 
unable to conduct their own investigations, and is additionally limited, absent a 
Security Council referral, to countries that joined as state parties, the ICC’s 
docket quickly became focused on African conflicts. This led to deep charges of 
politicization.114 
At one level, the resulting crisis of authority lies in the mandate of the 
Court, because the situations and often real-time crimes that the ICC is seized 
with are deeply enmeshed within ongoing diplomatic, political, and economic 
struggles. Its authority is further affected by the fact that the Court must be 
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sufficiently nimble to work with existing cases as well as those that are referred 
to it by the Security Council. As Alex Whiting, who earlier served in the ICTY 
and then as both Investigation and Prosecution Coordinator with the ICC 
notes, in the ICC “each investigation is largely shaped by the constraints and 
opportunities peculiar to the situation at hand.”115 Yet this article suggests that 
despite the differences presented by each situation, ICC prosecutors have also 
adopted strategies designed to reflect the Court’s possible sources of authority. 
The focus of the Office of the Prosecutor has thus been on distancing itself from 
any charges of politicization by changing the way in which evidence is gathered 
and presented. 
For the ICC Prosecutor, the need to deflect charges of politicization—
which, by contrast, were less prevalent in the geopolitical context of the ICTY 
due to the breadth of political support for the Tribunal—has led to a strategy 
focused on legal analysis and procedure decoupled from investigations. This is 
partly explained by the budgetary constraints of the Court, including the cost of 
witness testimony, the risks of testimony being undermined or withdrawn,116 and 
the bureaucratic structure of the Prosecutor’s office.117 It is also the case that the 
ongoing context of conflict makes it a challenge for the ICC Prosecutor to 
gauge the strength of eventual testimony in Court.118 This is further 
underwritten by security concerns present on the ground during ongoing 
conflicts,119 so that the capacity for the Prosecutor to investigate depends on 
support from interested parties. 
Echoing Justice Jackson’s strategy at Nuremberg, Ocampo observed that 
“[o]ur goal is to go even further,” in particular, to prosecute “a case with no 
witnesses, no victims.”120 And indeed the ICC has gone on to invest heavily in 
the formal legal “in-house” development of its cases, pursuing a strategy relying 
on social science and documentary methods—even if to-date witnesses remain 
the core of the prosecutions.121 And given that the ICC’s strongest base of 
authority lies in the professional and academic legal community, it is not 
surprising that the Office of the Prosecutor has sought to play to this strength 
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by investing in “pure law”122 and by seeking to distance investigatory partners so 
as to control the collection of witness testimony and avoid charges of 
politicization. Thus a continued strategy to resonate with and shore up support 
among the Prosecutor’s most significant professional constituencies is apparent. 
In the ICC, this prosecutorial strategy has been implemented in two main 
ways. First, at a bureaucratic level, the ICC Prosecutor reorganized the Office 
of the Prosecutor around a more purely legal orientation.123 Likely as an 
outgrowth of the legal professionalization of the field of international criminal 
law, the staff of the Office came with a legal and specialized training in 
international criminal law. By 2009, prosecutions were largely overseen from 
within the Office of the Prosecutor in The Hague and by a staff with a legal 
background or experience in human rights organizations, rather than a training 
in police investigation focused, by contrast, more on chain of custody and 
avoidance of hearsay in the collection of victim statements.  The ICC 
Prosecutor saw himself as developing a strategy involving cases against top 
figures and as centering on the narrower legal issue of establishing the 
responsibility for command authority over crimes rather than proving the 
occurrence of the crimes themselves. As others have pointed out, this decision 
to avoid on-the-ground field investigations from within the Office of the 
Prosecutor has been fundamentally strategic on the part of the Prosecutor, and 
it “seems to have been a point of pride for the Office.”124 The Court’s limited 
authority is also reflected by pressures on its budget, and its hesitation to 
request additional budgetary resources from the Assembly of States Parties.125 
Conducting investigations has, as one journalist suggests, become “but the poor 
cousin of the international politics of the [ICC].”126 
The result of this strategy is that the Prosecutor has relied heavily on 
developing evidence for the prosecutions by relying on external NGOs already 
working in the politically charged contexts of the ICC’s investigations. In the 
place of ICC-led investigators, the Court came to rely heavily on NGOs already 
pre-positioned in Africa when conducting their investigations. This has been 
harshly criticized by the ICC judges, who in the Court’s first prosecution 
expressed concern with “the use by the prosecution of local intermediaries in 
the DRC,” and indicated that the prosecution “should not have delegated its 
investigative responsibilities to intermediaries.”127 In the same vein, the Court in 
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Lubanga quoted William Pace, the founding convener of the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, stating that “human rights and humanitarian 
organizations are lousy criminal investigators.”128 It therefore focused the 
greatest bulk of its decision on these questions of investigation and evidence, 
and it stressed the gap between “the information provided by human rights 
groups . . .  eager to call international attention to crises and “forensic evidence 
that can be used by a prosecutor.”129 This prosecutorial strategy was again 
criticized in the case against former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo, 
with the Court expressing its concern over hearsay received from NGO 
reports.130 
The second major approach of the Prosecution to emphasize “pure law” is 
evident in its case development strategy, which focuses on selecting a small 
number of cases that can have legal impact quickly, rather than undergoing a 
lengthy process of pursuing all potential leads. This is partly explained, again, 
by the lack of investigatory staffing. It was also a response to the Prosecutor’s 
desire to move swiftly, in the face of political pressure and an empty docket 
until the arrest of its first indictee in 2006. Bernard Lavigne, who led an early 
investigatory team in Lubanga and was called to testify on the question of 
evidence, noted what he referred to as the “pressure [of] public opinion 
internationally,”131 which would have included, at the time, fierce U.S. resistance 
to the Court’s operations. 
Lawyers representing victims have thus taken the Prosecutor to task for 
only prosecuting Lubanga for the crime of enrolling children as soldiers, rather 
than for crimes related to children’s treatment and sexual exploitation. This is 
tied to the lack of prosecutorial attention that is placed within the Office of the 
Prosecutor on investigations, including the small teams that are deployed and 
the comparatively short time frame of which they can avail themselves.132 Yet 
here too the emphasis has been on producing the ICC’s authority by drawing on 
a limited number of compelling legal cases to launch the Court. As one former 
investigator said,  
We knew that during killings, rapes happened [but] the idea was that the first ICC trial 
could not fail. To organize a good trial, the prosecutor selected child soldiers as the 
only charge against Lubanga and [decided] to drop the others . . . against the will of 
many investigators.
133
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Throughout the Court’s work, then, the focus of the ICC Prosecutor has been 
on narrowing the scope of investigations, selecting a small number of incidents, 
and developing cases likely to draw public attention to leading figures rather 
than prosecuting atrocities more broadly. As a senior ICC prosecutor stated in 
an interview: 
We have always followed a policy where we do not want to have ICTY type of 
investigations where we charge basically the history of the Balkans in one case so that 
is an attempt to write history in criminal proceedings . . . . So what we do is we focus 
our investigations on a very limited number of crimes, we also focus our investigations 
on those persons whom we believe bear the greatest responsibility . . . . We are also 
very selective in how many witnesses we bring.134 
The prosecutorial strategy of the ICC is not only different, then, from the 
ICTY—it is most akin to that of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg. The desire to 
bring a comparatively small number of cases, to highlight leadership figures 
rather than to prosecute a full scope of atrocities, and to avoid broad witness 
testimony echoes the evidentiary and prosecutorial strategy of Nuremberg. 
Although occurring in fundamentally different geopolitical contexts—the IMT 
at Nuremberg enjoyed access to all documents and defendants and was 
supported with narrow and intermediate authority, whereas the ICC is in the 
reverse situation of enjoying extensive authority among a community of 
practice but has neither narrow nor intermediate authority at its disposal—the 
two courts have reacted to their authority constraints in fundamentally similar 
ways at the level of prosecutorial strategy. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
In many international courts, authority turns on judicial decisions. Yet in the 
context of international criminal courts, prosecutorial strategy is often at the 
core of the building or waning of authority. This is partly because of the power 
of prosecutors to make headlines with indictments, and it is partly because of 
the highly contentious and atypical political environments in which these courts 
operate. If these political environments are atypical, this article’s survey of the 
prosecutorial strategy developed by these courts suggests that in building their 
authority, prosecutors are acutely aware of the authority they enjoy and thus 
seek to speak to the constituencies they need—while avoiding others—through 
their prosecutorial practices. 
This article provides insight into the varying forms of de facto authority that 
international criminal courts enjoy, and in light of which prosecutors develop 
practices that reflect and seek to adapt to the external contexts in which they 
operate. Further, this article demonstrates that the IMT at Nuremberg, which 
enjoyed narrow and intermediate authority—with full access to documents and 
evidence, but also with skepticism in some quarters over its legalistic mandate—
sits in stark contrast to the ICTY and the ICC, and their needs for evidence, 
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defendants, and state cooperation. 
Different prosecutorial practices thus emerge. Justice Jackson at 
Nuremberg, by having all available evidence at his disposal, spoke mainly to a 
professional community in the specific domestic context of the United States 
rather than draw in the media or others through victim testimony. This article 
suggests that this internal and external contestation, the unevenness of 
authority of the IMT at Nuremberg, and the geopolitical centrality of the 
United States in the post–World War II moment, underwrote the prosecutorial 
motivation to rely on an evidentiary strategy highlighting documents 
throughout the trial. ICTY prosecutors, by contrast, drew on the extensive 
authority they enjoyed to build a range of compliance partners for the 
Tribunal—at first focusing on building investigatory and media networks for the 
prosecutors, and then seeking out compliance partners in domestic courts as the 
Tribunal’s extensive authority was in danger of waning. And in the ICC, whose 
authority is mainly limited to the community of international law practitioners 
and NGOs directly supporting the ICC and seeking to deflect charges of 
politicization, the prosecutorial strategy has aimed at distancing itself from 
investigation and the murky contexts of ongoing conflicts, instead limiting its 
reach to a narrow set of legal issues and cases. 
In the context of international criminal courts, the analysis of authority and 
prosecutorial practice is tied to the question of how to speak authoritatively 
about atrocity. In contrast to teleological accounts of international criminal law 
that presume this authority grows with time, this article suggests that the narrow 
and intermediate aspects of international criminal court authority have waned 
over time. In light of this, prosecutors have scrambled to build the authority 
they need. As a result, the ICTY had sufficient extensive authority from which 
the Tribunal could draw by tightly coupling its links with compliance partners to 
overcome weaker narrow and intermediate authority. Yet in the ICC, the risks 
of being identified as politicized, combined with the mandate constraints in 
which the Court operates, has led the Office of the Prosecutor to distance itself 
from compliance partners, a loose coupling that has led to skepticism from 
judges and victims alike. Perhaps mirroring these courts’ loss of authority 
externally, the result has been that, though prosecutors have matched their 
strategies to the available forms of authority they could marshal, the field of 
international criminal law has—if anything—lost more authority than it has 
gained. 
 
